Investigation into the high-speed train accident in Ankara, where the 9 died, was extended to TCDD managers. Prosecutors conducting the investigation, TCDD Regional Manager Duran Yaman who changed the train traffic in the region before the accident 4 day, YHT Gar Deputy Director Kadir Oğuz and YHT Gar Regional Directorate of Traffic and Station Management Service Manager Unal Sayıner took the statement as suspicious. Noting that the trains do not have the duty to control the hours of service, Sayıner, in his testimony, accused the engineer who died in the accident.
13 December 2018 3 in Ankara within the scope of the investigation carried out by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, among the XNUMX personnel was arrested by the switchman Osman Yildirim. Arrested insurgent Yildirim, Kadir Oguz, accused him of never checking until this time.
CREDENED THE MACHINES
According to Alican Uludağ's report in Cumhuriyet, Ünal Sayıner's statement was taken first as a witness and then as a suspect. In his statement, Sayıner accused the deceased YHT mechanics and stated the following: “The collision occurred because the YHT number 06.30, which was departing from Ankara YHT Station at 81201:1, was sent from the Line 2 road while it was supposed to be sent from the Line 1 road. When the train, which should go on the line 2, when the line 1 enters the road, an illegal movement may cause danger, it should be detected and reported to the center by the train driver, even if it is thought that the train may come from the train according to the announced ORER plan, it was not possible to compensate for the error by continuing on its way. . Because it is predetermined from which line the trains will go and come. This train operating with the same number uses the same route (Line XNUMX road).
SCISSORS NOT CHANGED
KazanStating that the central management of the trains' traffic (TMI) system is implemented in the region where the train is taking place, the suspect service manager Sayıner said, “The YHT that will go to Konya at 06.30 should be moved from the 11th road and transferred from Line 150 to Line 2 after approximately 1 meters. While the switch No. M74 providing this transition should be made suitable for the transition to Line 1 with electric motors by means of the buttons in the locked panel used by the train staff, the empty set that will provide the YHT that will go to Eskişehir from the 06.50th road at 13 is from the Line 2 road. Since it was taken to Route 13, the switch is not arranged to divert from Line 2 to Line 1 again. Although it was not arranged, it can be heard from the phone records that the train dispatcher told the dispatcher that the switch was to Line 1. Upon this information, the dispatcher dispatched YHT, assuming that it was diverted to Line 1. (Cumhuriyet)