TCDD accused the mechanic of the dead with scissors. The scissors was not given sufficient training. When the train line entered 1, the control center was not searched. 9 The change in traffic in December caused the risk of encountering two trains.
CumhuriyetAlican Uludag's news; In the investigation report prepared by the TCDD Inspection Board, about the high-speed train accident in which 9 died in Ankara; accident, the train constitutes O. Y'in forget to change the shears and the wrong way to see the path of the three mechanic YHT'nin died because of the train was claimed to stop. On the other hand, in the report, which is also pointed out in the area of the accident, the lack of adequate training is given to the detained prisoner O.Y. Instead of 1 trainers, 2 trainee trainers did not work, there were not enough signs, and the train did not make any arrangements to call the command center when it entered Hat 1. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the risk of encountering two trains occurred with the reorganization of the train traffic in the region before the accident 4 days ago.
TCDD Inspection Board, 13 2018 9 93 54 XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX The XNUMX page report by Chief Inspector Ahmet Hamdi Yanilmaz and inspector Fatih Demir was sent to Ankara Public Prosecutor Ejder Oguz Ozdemir, who was conducting the investigation with the General Directorate of TCDD.
In the report, as the first reason of the accident, Konya detained train organization officer O.Y's 13 December 2018, the clock 06.30, YHT Gar 11 to make the voyage to Ankara-Konya. It is suggested that the 81201 train, which is available on the road, should be delivered via the Line 1 route, and it should lead to the departure of Hat 2. The report said that the O.Y forgot to change the scissors No. M74.
The second reason was the high-speed train machinists A. Y, HB and K.Ü. who were killed in the accident. YHT 8. In the traffic operating orders published by the Regional Directorate, the YHTs will be given the call of Hat 1 from Ankara YHT Gar-Esenkent direction and Hat 2 from the direction of Esenkent-Ankara YHT Gar and 1 except the road closure of the YHTs. YHT Machinists are known to watch their way.
The report noted the need for additional safety measures in the new application and identified the following three 'shortcomings': Ankara YHT Gar did not make arrangements to train the train by calling the command center when it entered Hat 1.
YHT Garage 23.00 07.00 trainer 1 in the West scissors 2 trainer, rather than the staff of the XNUMX train.
-9 XTRENE 2018 11 12 13 2 1 74 1 and 2 path before connecting to the line XNUMX and XNUMX line connecting the line XNUMX scissors MXNUMX scissors with the direction information and the line XNUMX Line XNUMX information does not indicate the markings.
Scissors training not provided
In the report, ver Scissor O.Y, TCDD'nin not given a full training under the instructions of the instruction, training records and documents to be kept to be kept to be kept, M74 No. to use the scissor device training is given to O.Y While this situation needs to be documented, such a document is not kept.
'Condemnation' to the managers
In the report, the other custodian traffic controller EEE'e 'to warn', the motion officer Sinan Yavuz '' condemnation is requested '; YHT 8 Regional Manager DY, traffic and station management manager Ü., and traffic and station management assistant manager ET and Ankara YHT station assistant manager K.O. requested.
A second accident prevented by 5
In the report, Sincan-Kayas running Line 2 commuter trains from 45 seconds after the accident came to the station and the stop at the scene 5 meters, stating that a second catastrophe was prevented by stating that was stopped.