While the debate on nuclear deterrence within NATO in recent years has focussed on two pressing issues – the changing threat posed by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella – a third issue vital to the effectiveness of the alliance’s nuclear deterrent has been largely ignored: A credible and up-to-date nuclear strategy.
The success of nuclear deterrence depends not only on weapons, but also on the ability and political will to use them in extreme situations. This requires fundamental strategic decisions: What principles will apply to a possible use of nuclear weapons? Which objectives would be appropriate? What procedures will be followed within the alliance to authorise such an exceptional situation?
The Gap of Cold War Strategy and the Current Need
During the Cold War, NATO had developed a detailed nuclear strategy, including political guidelines on the possible use of nuclear weapons, procedures for inter-allied consultation and co-ordination of nuclear targeting. However, with the end of the East-West conflict and the hope of obtaining a permanent partner in Russia, this elaborate structure was largely dismantled.
As a result, NATO today lacks a conceptual consensus on how to deal with an aggressive and vengeful Russia and how to strengthen the credibility of nuclear deterrence. This deficiency applies not only to the military posture but also to the strategic conceptual level.
Redesign Against New Threats: Limited Use
Building a modern NATO nuclear strategy does not require reinventing the wheel. Instead, the concepts and procedures of the Cold War provide a strong foundation that can be adapted to the security policy realities of the 21st century.
Today’s security environment is different from the once expected rapid and far-reaching military advance of the Soviet Union. Russia is expected to take limited action in areas such as the Baltic states. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that Russian nuclear weapons could be used on NATO territory, in particular against ports or transport hubs in order to impede the movement of NATO troops and the exit of American reinforcements to Europe.
In such an extreme case, NATO’s response would not be a full-scale nuclear war, as in the Cold War. Instead, a move to escalate nuclear tensions would primarily serve the political purpose of demonstrating a willingness to defend itself against an aggressor and persuading it to cease hostilities.
Strategic Targeting and Consultation Procedures
For the use of nuclear weapons to be taken seriously as a warning, it must also harm the aggressor, rather than be merely symbolic. In this context, the new strategic approach includes the following points:
Targeting: Nuclear targeting should focus primarily on Russian territory and possibly Belarus. Focusing on NATO territory, as in the Cold War, can be interpreted as a lack of resolve.
Political Purpose: Nuclear use should not be intended to start a nuclear war, but rather to serve as a political warning and deterrent.
In order to ensure a broad consensus in NATO in the event of the use of nuclear weapons, the Cold War-era nuclear consultation arrangements should be reintroduced. Since there is no longer any fear of rapid Russian operations from east to west, it is assumed that there will be enough time for such consultations.
The Role of France: Although France is not represented in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), it should be included in such discussions.
Final Decision Authority: The final decision-making authority should rest solely with NATO’s nuclear powers (US, UK). There is no majority vote or veto of Member States.
Finally, NATO should not only develop a new nuclear strategic memorandum, but also regularly put in place the relevant procedures and restart these political-strategic exercises, as was done in the late 1980s under the WINTEX exercises. This transparency is critical both to send a signal of resolve to Russia and to ensure public acceptance of the concept of nuclear deterrence.
