China’s ever-expanding ballistic missile arsenal is prompting India to reassess its defense strategies. In response to this threat, New Delhi plans to establish a joint military formation called the Integrated Rocket Force (IRF), which will consolidate and expand the country’s non-nuclear missiles under a single umbrella. However, as this proposed missile force project faces delays, analysts warn that the IRF, in its current form, may prove inadequate against China’s long-range missiles. This mismatch could leave India facing a critical dilemma: either endure Chinese attacks without the ability to retaliate or turn to nuclear weapons.
The Purpose of the IRF: To Address Conventional Asymmetry
Although the IRF was first proposed in 2021, it remains a theoretical project that has not yet been implemented. Debak Das, a professor of peace and security at the University of Denver, states that the primary objective of the IRF is to “eliminate India’s conventional war asymmetry vis-à-vis China.” This conventional rocket force aims to provide India with the capability to engage in military conflict with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) without escalating to the nuclear level.
The IRF, which will mirror the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)—the missile branch of the Chinese military—in some respects, is designed as a joint land, sea, and air force organization. However, unlike the PLARF, the IRF will be responsible only for conventional rockets; India’s nuclear-capable intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs and IRBMs) will remain under the command of the Strategic Forces Command.
Range Differences and Strategic Mismatch
The IRF is planned to be equipped with weapons such as the Brahmos cruise missile, the Pinaka multiple rocket launcher system, and the Pralay tactical ballistic missile. However, the range of these conventional weapons will not exceed 500 kilometers and will only be able to reach the Tibetan Plateau and border regions.
In contrast, the range of China’s ballistic missiles, such as the DF-26 and DF-100, can reach up to 2,000 kilometers. Kartik Bommakanti of the Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation notes that Chinese missiles “can strike deep into Indian territory even if launched from deep within mainland China.” Bommakanti argues that India must also render China’s economic and industrial centers—located in the country’s central and eastern regions—vulnerable to Indian long-range missiles.
China’s arsenal, which has grown over the past four years to reach 3,500 missiles, has become a significant factor in Asian security for India, just as it has for Taiwan and the U.S. (through bases such as Guam). For India, the main concern is the destruction that Chinese missiles could cause in a new conflict along the 3,400-kilometer border in the Himalayas. As seen in the war in Ukraine, long-range munitions are of great importance in this region, where ground combat operations could turn into a nightmare by striking targets such as supply depots, headquarters, and critical infrastructure.
Obstacles Facing the IRF and the Nuclear Question Mark
Although Bommakanti suggests that India could use the 5,000-kilometer Agni-5 IRBMs, which are allocated to its nuclear forces for conventional missions, and could develop a long-range hypersonic weapon, he argues that a coordination structure like the IRF is essential for the effective integration of missile capabilities.
However, the implementation of the IRF faces challenges, such as competition among military units that are reluctant to relinquish control of their missiles to a single command center. According to an analysis by the U.S. think tank CSIS, concerns have been raised that the IRF may be limited to assets from the army and air force, and that it remains unclear whether it will also control launch, communications, and intelligence systems.
Existential Questions and the Pakistani Dynamic
Because China and India possess nuclear weapons, even without nuclear warheads, the possibility of two nuclear powers launching conventional missiles is viewed as an “apocalyptic” scenario due to the risk of the conflict escalating into a thermonuclear war. Debak Das notes that India’s adoption of a doctrine to acquire conventional deep-strike capabilities against China’s strategic infrastructure has raised the issue of China being able to do the same against India.
The IRF’s targeting of China has also spurred Pakistan into action. According to Das, Pakistan’s recent announcement of the establishment of its Army Rocket Force is “a response to India’s IRF announcement.” As Pakistan’s conventional rocket forces mature, it will seek to minimize the asymmetry in its relationship with India.
The China-India missile competition raises the question of whether the two nuclear powers could fire conventional missiles at each other’s homelands without triggering a thermonuclear escalation. Das notes that New Delhi hopes the IRF will dampen Beijing’s appetite for low-level conflicts, but points out that India is still far from matching China in traditional military capabilities, and that the effectiveness of concepts like the IRF will become clear over time.
