
NATO and Ukrainian officials are preparing to test new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies aimed at addressing a persistent threat in the ongoing war in Ukraine: a threat that cannot be brought down by electronic means. Russian-made first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables is defined as.
Event to be Held in Tallinn and Expected Solutions
The event, organized by the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Education and Training Center and NATO Allied Command Transformation, aimed to introduce new countermeasures that are becoming widespread among defense companies. On June 20 in Tallinn, Estonia will be realized.
The proposed countermeasures are expected to meet certain criteria:
- Least A detection range of 500 meters to have.
- Able to work day and night.
- Having a weight of less than 100 kilograms.
- The total cost does not exceed $100.
The Challenge of Fiber Optic Cable FPV Drones
FPV drones, which operate over fiber optic cables, pose a new global military challenge because they are largely immune to jamming and interference. These cheap, small weapons transmit signals over a thin cable, making them resistant to electromagnetic interference. The drones were a key part of Ukraine’s largest long-range offensive since the start of the war on June 1, targeting Russian warplanes and strategic targets with smuggled weapons.
Federico Borsari, a researcher at the Center for European Policy Analysis, said the emergence of command-wire drones opens a new chapter in the cat-and-mouse game played by both sides over innovations and countermeasures in drone warfare. “From a technical perspective, Russia and Ukraine are now trying to challenge the usual balance between range, speed, payload and endurance, using more powerful batteries and longer fiber-optic spools to increase their capabilities,” Borsari said.
He added that longer cables are useful in carrying out attacks and ambush tactics against enemy logistics, where FPVs lie dormant near roads and are activated by the operator when a convoy passes nearby.
Current Countermeasures and Future Strategies
Ukrainian soldiers have until now favoured an FPV tracking tactic that involves detecting reflective fibres behind drones, which are easiest to spot in bright sunlight, and tracing them back to Russian operators. In one documented incident, a drone unit from the Ukrainian National Guard’s Black Mountain Brigade hit a Russian base during the winter months by following a maze of fibre optics back to its hideout.
But with the explosion in the use of fiber optic FPVs, old cables are now scattered across the battlefield, creating mazes that are nearly impossible to trace back to launch points.
Borsari said Ukraine was also testing active countermeasures, including using drone interceptors and quadcopters to destroy FPVs in flight or on the ground by dropping small bombs on them. “The best defense right now is a combination of passive and active countermeasures, and should also include robust signals intelligence and other intelligence-gathering techniques to disrupt Russian communications and detect drone crews,” he said, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach. The activity is seen as a critical step in developing technological solutions to the new challenges posed by fiber-optic cable drones.