The Root Cause of the YHT Disaster 'Known Negligence' Chain

yht facian
yht facian

It turned out that the YHT disaster in Ankara, where 9 people died, came after the chain of negligence. The company, which received the tender, made a 'temporary admission application' before the project was completed and opened the line for expeditions. However, despite the fact that 12 trains run a day, this signal was not included in the tender, but the 'signaling system' was not established. In spite of the warnings, the inevitable disaster occurred when the expeditions continued.

High-Speed ​​Train (YHT), in which 9 people died and more than 90 people were injured in Ankara, was started with a trip without signaling, despite all the warnings of the experts. Striking information about the lack of signalization causing disaster has emerged. Within the scope of Başkentray project; Firm K received the project commitment, namely infrastructure and superstructure, by tender. The signal project is also within the scope of this job. Company K signaled the signaling part to the T group. Within the scope of the signal project, the rail circuits were supplied from the Italian company E, under the pressure of the administration. Despite T's warning that “These rail circuits do not work in our signal system”, it was accepted by a delegation in Italy at the insistence of the administration and its fee was paid. Track circuits were manufactured and assembled in Turkey but T also firms as the system did not work. This process took about 9 months. Now, the rail circuits are tried to be obtained from S Company. If the warning of company T had been listened from the beginning, this disaster would not have happened.


However, the Court of Accounts announced the report of the Ministry of Transport after the disaster. It was underlined that many railways were put into service before the signaling system of the railway was completed, as in the railroad, where the accident occurred in Ankara. According to the report, the two projects that were tendered were delivered before the completion of the productions affecting life safety such as signaling and electrification. It was stated that one of these railway lines was the Kars-Tbilisi Railway Project, which was tendered to 2 million liras. Here are the findings in the report: “It was stated that the Kars-Tbilisi Railway Line was completed and opened for trade. Although it is true that the railway was opened to trade, the statement that the project was completed does not reflect the truth. A significant part of the productions in the project could not be completed because the contract price was filled. Especially tunnel and superstructure manufacturing was incomplete and electrification, signaling and telecommunication productions were not included in the contract. In order to complete the aforementioned productions, 700nd supply tender will be made. ”

The Court of Accounts found that in another railway project, which cost 658 million liras, the work was received without the installation of the electrification and signaling system, and the contractor company was paid, as if all work was done. In the report, “It is seen that 17 percent of the tunnels, 41 percent of the superstructure and 41 percent of the bridges and viaducts that make up the majority of the project have been completed and no manufacturing related to electrification, signaling and telecommunications has been made. Only 33 percent of the project has been completed. ”


The GK partnership, whose official name is 'Sincan-Ankara-Kayaş Line', took over. The project is still visible in the 'ongoing projects' section on the company's website. Filling work, route excavation, station arrangement, line laying, over and underpasses, culverts, as well as electrification works, signalization and telecommunications are also within the scope of the tender. However, before the project was finished, the company started to use the 'temporary admission' method while its work continued.


The only system that prevents the trains from coming across the same line is the signalization system, this line, which makes 12 trains a day, is not finished. When a citizen aware of this situation became aware of the lack of signaling in the forums, he immediately asked the question to CIMER. CİMER conveys the answer received on November 14 as follows: “Your application numbered xxxxxxxxxx to the Republic of Turkey Presidency Communication Center (CİMER) on 22.10.2018 was answered by the Directorate of Railway Modernization Department on 14.11.2018: All safety and security measures were taken in Başkentray operation. management is carried out as TMI (Centralized Telephone Management of Traffic) with shears controlled. ”


United Transport Workers' Union (BTS) Chairman Hasan Bektas Machinist According to data shared moment 12 534 thousand kilometer line in Turkey only 5 534 thousand kilometers signalization. The rest is managed by TMI method.


The dispatcher SY, the switchman OY, and the controller EEE, who was seen as responsible for the accident, were taken to the courthouse yesterday with reverse handcuffs after their queries at the police station for days. In the statement of the prosecutor's office, the dispatcher SY said, “I was not informed about the line change. I have no fault in the high-speed train accident. YHT, supposed to go from line 1, entered line 2. "I think that the management, which connects the acceptance and dispatch of the trains to the work of the switchman, is responsible by not taking the necessary precautions," he said. The dispatcher said it was the administration that changed the criminal's referral system. Three TCDD officers who testified to the prosecutor were arrested. - Source DECISION

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